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CAMPUS NOTES.
J. C. Johnson, of Emporium, Pa., a
lawyer of prominence and solicitor
for the Penna. R. R. Co., representing the
48th di.trict, was in town Saturday, November 14th, visiting his son, who is a
member of the class of '06.
Quite a number of Law School men went
to Harrisburg Saturday night, November
14th, to meet the Dickinson foot ball team
returning from their victory over State
College at Williamsport, Pa.
Setzer, '05, and Reeser, '05, participated
in a foot ball game in Harrisburg on Saturday, November 14th.
CLASS NOTES.
Laub, M Alee and Rexach, -all of the
class of '06, took the examination for registration as law students in Cumberland
county on November 24th.
The officers elected by the Junior class
for the ensuing year are as follows: Laub,
president; Barner, secretary; Ferguson,
treasurer.

The officers elected by the Senior class
for the ensuing year are as follows: Flynn,
president; Yocum, vice president; Lourimer, secretary; Lanard, historian; Cook,
treasurer.
F. Pierce Kugler, of Linfleld,
entered the class of '06.

has

ALUMNI NOTES
Walter S. Bishop, '03, is in Johnstown,
preparing for the examination for admission to the Philadelphia Bar.
Clarence F. Albertson, '03, of Atlantic
City, recently passed the finalexamination
for admission to the Supreme Court of
New Jersey. THE FoRuMr regrets to learn
of the recent death of Mr. Albertson's
sister.
D. Lloyd Claycomb, '03, member of the
Bedford County Bar, at present associated
with Hou. John M. Reynolds, was in Carlisle to witness the Lehigh-Dickinson
game,
Thos B. Wilson, '03, is the junior member of the law firm of Stone, Simons and
Wilson, at Bradford, Pa.
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A. Irving Yeagley, '03; who successfuilly
passed the Supreme Court examination
last June, is engaged in teaching at Kleinfeltersville in conjunction with his legal
work. lie was admitted to practice in
Lebanon county Oct. 5, 1903.
H. Spencer Vastine, '03, conducted a case
before an auditor in Sunbury on Saturday,
Nov. 14, 1903.
Samuel B. Kaufman, '03, who is registered in the office of Vin. T. Rourke, Esq.,
of Reading, was a visitor at the Law
School on Monday, November 9th.
A. C. McIntire, '01, is a member of a
Martinsburg, V. Va., law firm. His firm
has offices in both Martinsburg and
Berkeley Springs, V. Va.

John Bertram Lavens, '02, is with the
Pennsylvania Electric Vehicle Co., 2.50
Broad St., Phila.
Robert H. Moon, '02, has opened an office
in Parkersburg, V. Va., and is al;o engaged in mine brokerage.
Chas. A. Piper, '01, formerly of Tyrone,
Pa., died recently in Oklahoma, under
painful circumstances. He had but recently settled in Oklahoma City and been
admitted to the bar. Attacked with appendicitis, he submitted to an operation,
from the exhaustion of which he never
rallied. None of his relatives were with
him, his death having come so suddenly.
A RESOLUTION.
WHEREAS, Charles A. Piper, a former

J. F. and Frank Rhodes, both of '01,
have located at Clarksburg, W.Va., where
they have established a large practice.
Muir, of '02, has returned from Iowa and
intends practicing in Pennsylvania.
Chas. F. Hickernell, '03, was admitted
to the Lebanon County Bar Oct. 26, 1903.
Daniel Kline, '01, of the Luzerne County
Bar, was in Harrisburg November 18th,
attending a meeting of the Board of Pardons. During his short sojourn in this
part of the State he made a brief visit to
his Alma Mater.
E. L. Dively, '03, of Altoona, Pa., is
making an extended visit among his
friends in Carlisle.
R. M. Wright, whose wife was formerly
Miss Katherine Spotts, of Carlisle, is practicing law at Seattle, Wash.
Chas. E. Daniels, '98, is prospering in
the practice of law at Scranton, Pa.
Albert S. Longbottonm, '03, will practice
in Philadelphia.
Newton R. Turner, '01, is practicing in
Easton, Pa.
Harry P. Katz, '01, has located in the
Stafford Building, 1112 Chestnut St., Phila.

Wencel Hartman, '01, is a bond clerk in
the office of the District Attorney of Philadelphia.

member of the Dickinson Chapter of Delta
Chi Fraternity has, through the infinite
wisdom of God, been summoned from this
earth, be it
Resolved, That by his death, we, the
members of Delta Chi Fraternity, suffer
the loss of one who was a loyal, earnest
and enthusiastic brotherin the Fraternitj,
a kind friend and congenial companion to
all who were associated with him in the
Fraternal life. His memory -will ever be
cherished in the Fraternity and his influence will long be felt among us. Be it
further
Resolvcd, That we especially mourn the
loss of one whose early manhood gave
promise of so much usefulness.
Be it
further
l?c"olcd, That we extend to the family
of our late brother in this, their hour of
sorrow and grief, our deepest and most
sincere sympathy. Also be it
Resolved, That a copy of these resolutions be sent to the bereaved family and
that said resolutions be inserted in TH.E
FORUM.
E. F. HELLERI
PAUL WILLIS
H. F. LAUB
Carlsle, Pa., Dec., 1903
FRATERNITY NOTES.
DELTA CII I.
Since the last issue of TirE FoRumi Delta
Chi has initiated the following men: Bowman, McAlee, Laub and Braddock, all of
'06; and pledged Oyer, a special student.
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TIRETA LAMBDA Piii.
Theta Lambda Phi has recently initiated
the following mnen: Hassert, '05, and Davis
and Walt, '06.
During the pa-t week the SupremeSenate of the Theta Lambda Phi approved an
application from students of the Law
Department of Cornell University, for a
chapter of the above fraternity.
At present, applications for chapters in
several other law schools are under consideration.

MOOT COURT.
POSTEN TRANSFER CO. vs. LOUIS
FISHER.
,S'ale-l1'incixiland acgent-Liability of
purehaserwho ,'ecei'es goods from one
who wrongfully obtains )ossession.
STATBEME2NT OF THE CASE.

The llaintiff company are livery keepers in Wilkesbarre, Pa., and in connection with their business they are wont to
accumulate a quantity of what is commonly called junk.
Defendant deals extensively in the junk
trade, buying and selling the same. He
also has five or six wagons to collect the
junk and bring the same to hisyard where
It is sold.
On June 30th last, a man unknown to
the plaintiff company came to one of tie
plaintifffirm and presenting defendant's
business card said he desired to buy some
junk, that he was the defendant's authorized agent, although his name lid not appear on the card. The card simply bore
defendant's name as "dealer injunk," etc.
Plaintiffentered into negotiations with
this man and coml)leted the sale of the
junk to the defendant. Plaintiff and defendant never had dealings before and
their respective places of business were
over a half mile apart.
Meyers (that being the name of the
man who bore the card) told plaintiff that
defendant's wagon would call for the
junk shortly.
On the afternoon of June 30th defendant's wagon, along with the card bearer of
the morning and with one of defendant's
teamsters, drove to plaintiff's place of
business and carted away the purchase of

the morning. Defendant's name, as on
the card. appeared on the wagon.
Plaintiff was assured by Meyers that he
would hand a bill, which plaintiff gave
him, to the defendant. This bill was taken
by TMeyers as the wagon left plaintiffs
place of business.
The goods were charged to defendant on
the back of the card of the defendant
which Meyers had presented to plaintiff.
This card has since been lost. Said card
can be accounted for and its loss duly
proven.
A diligent search has been made for the
card up to the time of the trial.
Plaintiff knew of the defendant, but
only in a business way.
Meyers sold the goods to defendant,
who paid Meyers by check, which check
was paid through the clearing house.
Plaintiff mailed defendant a bill on
July 1st, as per his custom to so mail bills.
Plaintiff is accustomed to keeping his accounts in the livery business by memoranda. No account against the defendant
was opened on the ledger.
A true copy of the bill mailed the defendant was offered in evidence to charge
defendant for goods sold and delivered.
Plaintiff received word by telephone
from defendant six days after receiving
the bill that he had paid Meyers and did
not owe plaintiff any sum whatever. He
did not deny receiving the goods.
Defendant admitted ol cross-examination that he and Meyers were total
strangers and that he did not know if
iMeyers had a place of business or not and
that he had never seen Meyers before.
BENJAIIN and CARLIN for plaintiff.
The sale of goods tortiously obtained
ve'ts no title in second vendee. Barker v.
Dinsmore, 72 Pa. 427.
The owner may waive the tort and sue
in .ssumpsit. McCullough v. fcCullough,
14 Pa. 295; Trubat and Haley, 0.1494
VILLs for defendant.
Assumpsit does not lie unless there is an
express or implied contract. Bethlehem
B. & F. Co., 81 Pa. 446.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
There are but two theories upon which
the plaintiff could maintain assumpsit
against the defendant in this action. The
first is that of the agency of Meyers; the
second is that the defendant was guilty of
a conversion and thus would be liable in
indebilatus assumpsit.
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ant did not, in fact, buy, nor did he do any
We are of the opinion that the defendant,
acts which could estop him from denying
Fisher, in no wise appeared to the Posten
that he bought the junk.
Co. as principal, so that he might not
No title to the junk passed from the
later deny the agency of Meyers. The
plaintiff and he might have recovered the
mere possession of a business card and the
goods in replevin. It does not appear that
use of Fisher's wagon were not circuma demand for them of Fisher had been unstances which would estop him. The
successfully made or that any thing else
possession of the one, and the use of the
had happened showing Fisher's intention
other, might suggest the relation of the
to convert them. Hence, he cannot be
principal and agent; but are not such
circumstances as would cause us to con- made liable for their value in assumpsit.
Judgment affirmed.
clude that Fisher was by them estopped.
Hence, there could he no priority of contract between the Posten Co. and Fisher, JOHN SIMPSON vs. ADAM KELTIE.
and assumpsit could not be predicated
Contributory negligence a bar to reupon the theory of agency.
covery by a son of deceased-Duty of
Itis urged by the plaintiff that Fisher
employer to employee - Question of
obtained no title to the junk by the purnegligence for jury.
chase from Meyers, and Barker v. Dinsmore, 72 Pa. 427, hind Decan v. Shipper,
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
35 Pa. 239 are cited in support of the propKeltie was an employer of Simpson's
osition.
father, who was killed by an accident
We agree that Fisher took no title from
caused by the negligence of a co-employee.
Meyers, for Meyers had no title to convey;
The evidence tended to show that this
but the plaintiff can not recover in this
action from Fisher unless Meyer's con- employee was an habitually careless man
and that he bad been reprimanded three
version may be imputed to him. In
or four times for his fiegligence, by the
Barker v. Dinsmore, and Decan v. Shipdefendant.
per, replevin was maintained because no
The court instructed the jury that,-(a)
title passed; but assumpsit was not conPlaintiff can recover for the death of his
sidered.
father only on the same conditions on
The only question remaining is, was
which the father, if he had survived,
Fisher guilty of a conversion ? If he was
could recover for his injuries. (b) That
the tort may be waived and the Posten
as defendant is not liable to employee
Co. may declare in indebitatusassumpsit:
for the result of the negligence of the co14 Pa.
McCullough v. ,McCullough,
employee, neither is he liable to the son of
295.
To hold the defendant upon
such employee, if killed. (c) That the dethis theory, it is necessary to prove
ceased's contributory negligence would as
either, that he personally committed
much prevent his son's recovery as It
the conversion, or that the act was
would have prevented his own recovery.
done by his agent. From the statement
(d) That under all the evidence their
of facts, Fisher was in no manner connectverdict should be for the defendant.
ed with the transaction between Meyers
BENjA3IN and BARNHART for plaintiff.
and the Posten Co.; and his relation as a
The son may bring this action. Act
principal to Meyers, in any phase of the
April 26, 1855, P. L. 309.
case, has not been established. Hence,
The employer must exercise ordinary
there could be no recovery upon the
care in the selection of hisemployees, and
theory of conversion.
if he fails or neglects to do so, or if he retains them after he becomes acquainted
We fail to see wherein theAct of May 5,
with their unfitness or incompetency he
1899, could influence this case.
is answerable to the fellow servant for his
Judgment of non-suit is accordingly en- negligence in this respect. Huntington
tered for the defendant.
R. R. v. Decker, 84 Pa. 423; Frazier v. P.
R. R. Co., 88 Pa. 104; Caldwell v. Brown,
AMERMAN, J.
53 Pa. 453; O'Donnell v. Allegheny Valley
COURT.
SUPREME
OPINION OF THE
R. R. Co., 59 Pa. 239.
HILLYER and HELLER for defendant.
The sale was made by the plaintiff on inGeneral rule is that all workmen in the
tention to the defendant, but the defend-
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same employment, are fellow servants, so
that the negligence of one, causing injury
to another, does not render the employer
liable. L. V. Coal Co. v. Jones; 86 Pa.
432; N. Y. L. E. & U. v. Bell, 112 Pa.
400.
If contributory negligence existed there
can be no recovery although defendant
was guilty of negligence.
Sykes v.
Packer, 99 Pa. 465; Dooner v. Delaware,
171 Pa. 581.
Defendant is not liable because, while
he knew of employee'scarelessness, he did
what an ordinary person would do,
reprimanded him, and had reason to expbet it would cease. Brown v. Lyman,
31 Pa. 510; Ebright v. Mineral R. R. Co.,
15 Atl. 709.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Under the evidence produced, the court
Is of opinion that the learned judge of the
court below erred in his charge to the jury
in reference to specification B, which reads
as follows: "That as defendant is not liable to employee for the result of the negligence of a co-employee, neither is he liable
to the son of such employee if killed."
The evidence produced in this case tended
to show that the employer was negligent
in retaining an employee when he had
knowledge that he was an habitually careless man, and liable to do an act dangerous
to his co-employee. The fact that the employer had reprimanded the employee
three or four times for his negligence shows
conclusively the employer did not use
ordinary care in selecting the culpable
employee. In the case of Caldwell et ux
v. Brown et al, the court held that an
employer is not bound to indemnify an
employee for losses in consequence of the
ordinary risks of the business, nor of the
negligence of another person employed by
the same employer in the same business,
unless he has neglected to use ordinary
care in the selection of the culpable employee.
The employer, indeed, is bound to use
ordinary care in providing suitable structures and apparatus, and in selecting
proper servants, and is liable to other servants in the same employment if they are
injured by his own neglect of duty. Gilmore v. Eastern Railroad Corporation, 10
Allen 233. In the case of Ardesco Oil Co.
v. Gilson, 13 Smith 146, the court held
that employers owe their servants and
workmen the exercise of reasonable care
and proper diligence in providing them
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with safe machinery and suitable tools,
and employing with them fit and competent fellow-workmen.
In the case of Patterson v. the Pittsburg
and Connellsville R. R. Co., it was held
that if a master subjects his servants to
dangers such as he ought to provide
against, he is liable for any accident resulting from them.
In the case of Huntingdon and Broad
Top Mountain R. R. and Coal Co. v.
Decker, 1 Norris 119, it was held that
where a railroad company knowingly employs a conductor who is unfit for his position, it is responsible for his negligence to
a fellow-servant.
The court is of opinion that the-evidence
in this case was sufficient to require submission to the jury in reference to the
question whether the negligence of defendant had caused or resulted in the loss and
damage sustained by the plaintiff. The
court erred in instructing the jury that
defendant is not liable to the plaintiff for
the result of the negligence of a co-employee when the evidence shows that the
employer did not use ordinary care in the
selection of an employee. We, therefore.
conclude thata new trial should be granted.
CARLIN, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The negligence of the father of Simpson,
contributing to his injury, would have
barred his own recovery of damages. It
would equally bar a recovery by his son
of damages resulting from his death.
There is no error in the charge of the
court, in so far as it assumes this principle.
But the evidence tended to show that
the employee was a habitually careless
man. This habitual carelessness would
justify an inference of knowledge of it by
the employer. He would be negligent in
retaining such a person and for the negligent act of such a person, resulting in
damage to a fellow workman, he would be
liable to the latter.
The evidence went so far as to tend to
show that three acts of carelessness of the
employee had been known to the employer.
Whether the court could say that this was
conclusive-of negligence of the employer,
in retaining the employee or not, it surely
should have permitted the jury to say
whether the employer was negligent or
not, in retaining the employee.
Judgment affirmed.
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JOHN PRENTICE vs. HENRY
LEWIS.
Priorityof deeds recorded the same doa
-Time of recordingunder act of 1893Right of grantee to maintain trespas,
quareclausumnfregit.
STATExMENT OF THE CASE.

OPINION OF THE COURT.

The questions invNolved in the case at
bar are, first, as to the priority of a deed
recorded after ninety days from its execution, as against a later deed for the same
land recorded within that time; and,
second, as to the right of the first grantee
to maintain trespass quare clausum fregit
against the second grantee for an entry
upon the land in pursuance of the second
deed.
In regard to the first question, it is provided by the act of 1775, "that all deeds
and conveyances which from and after the
passage ofthis act, shall beexecuted within
this Commonwealth concerning any
lands, tenements, etc., * * * shall be recorded in the office of the Recorder of
Deeds within six months after the execution of such deed. And every deed not
so recorded within six mouths shall be
adjudged fraudulent and void as to any
subsequent purchaser." By a supplementary Actpassed May 19, 1893, P. L. 108, the
time limit is changed so that a deed now
must be recorded within ninety days.
But the rule as it stood under the old law
is the rule under the Act of 1893 except as to
the length of time allowed for recording.
Davey v. Ruffle), 162 Pa. 443.
This being so it, perhaps, might not be
amiss to look at the adjudicated cases reported prior to the passage of the act of
1893.
One of the most frequently
cited of these cases, and one that
contains a resumi
of the decisions
under the recording law of our state,

Win. Johnston by deed conveyed hi
farm to Prentice on August 3, 1900, and
eight weeks later by another deed gave to
Lewis a right to enter on and haul away
slate from a quarry for the period of five
years. The Prentice deed was left for
record December 22, 1900, at 8 a. in., and
the Lewis deed left for record on the same
day at 2 1).
m. Prentice did not take possession until October 5, 1900, at which
time also Lewis made his first entry forthe
purpose of beginning operations. This he
did with the knowledge of Prentice. This
is trespass q. c.f.
PRrCKLT and Coox for plaintiff.
Act of 1775 provides every deed shall be
recorded within six months or it shall be
judged fraudulent and void as against subsequent purchasers or mortgagees for valuable consideration.
But penalty of postponement is not incurred if mortgage or deed is recorded at
any time within six months from its execution or (2) if it is actually recorded before
the second deed is recorded. Friesv. Null,
164 Pa. 573.
The Act of 1893 changes the time of recording from six months to ninfety days,
but otherwise the law remains the same
as it stood under the Act of 1775. P. & L.
Digest, Col. 1572; Davey v. Ruffiel, 162 Pa.
443.
The plain reading of the acts is, that in is the case of Fries et at. v. 'Null,
154 Pa. 573. The essential facts of that
order to be first in right agaipst a prior
purchaser's deed, thesubsequent purchaser
case were that a mortgage was executed
must be first in time on record. Salt Co. on April 2, 1875, and recorded October 4,
v. Neal, 54 Pa. 9.
1875, which was more than six months
FLEITZ and WILcox for defendant.
after the date of the execution. A deed
The recording of a conveyance within for the same land was executed April 6,
six months from its date is essential to the 1875,
and recorded October 5, 1875, which
validity of the title granted by it, as
was one day less than six months after its
against a subsequent bona fide purchaser
for value. Poth v. Anstatt, 4 W. & S. execution. A divided court held that the
210; Ebner v. Gornsdie, 5 W. & S..49.
mortgage had priority of lien to the deed.
A deed not recorded witlhin six months Mr. Justice Green,
who wrote the opinion
from the date of its execution is fraudulent
of the majority of the court, said: "The
and void as against a subsequent purchaser
for value. Act of 17-75, P. & L., Vol. 1, penalty of postponement is not incurred
1572.
if (1) either the mortgage is recorded
Act of May 19, 1893, reduces time of act
of 1775 to ninety days and changes the at any time within six months from
law only in this respect. Davey v. Ruf- its execution; or (2) if it is actually
recorded before the deed is recorded."
fiel, 162 Pa. 443.

THE FORUM
"There is no matter of sentiment or
good morals about the transaction. It

the time prescribed by the Act of
Assembly.
issimply a question of written law founded,
The statement of facts shows Prentice
doubtless, upon just consideration of took possession on October 5, 1900, and that
public policy. It does not say that its
it was on this date that Lewis made his
words are to apply only when both parties
first entrance. Under these conditions, we
have been derelict for the whole period of think it fair to presume that Prentice was
six months, and if we undertake to do so
either in possession when Lewis arrived,
we must put words in the statute which
or else he arrived and took possession
are not there now, and this we cannot do."
shortly after Lewis began operations. If
This case settled the law under the act
so, we'think trespass q. c.f. may be mainof 1775, and, as we have seen, the law retained. Prentice had not only title, but
mains the same under the act of 1893, ex- possession, and the grant to Lewis was a
cept as to the time of recording.
grant of something which his grantor did
Fries v. Null was reargued, and the Sunot possess, nor have any right to convey.
preme Court again reached the same conUnder the circumstances, if Johnston still
clusion. See Fies v. Null, 158 Pa. 15. In
had been in possession on October 5th, we
Collins v. Aaron, 162 Pa. 539, the doctrine
deem it doubtful if the plaintiff could rewas laid down that "where two deeds are cover in an action of trespass q. c.f. Gillespie v. Railway, supra.
made of different dates from the same
grantor to different persons, neither of
Judgment is rendered for plaintiff.
which is recorded within six months, that
which is first recorded will take priority."
The last case we have been able to discover, and one that is almost analogous to
the case at bar, is that of Gillespie v. Railway Co., 17 Superior 574. The action was
ejectment by Gillespie v. the Railway Co.
The plaintiff claimed title by deed dated
Aug. 5, 1880, and recorded February, 1883.
Defendants claimed title by deed from the
same grantor, dated Dec. 22, 1882, and recorded April 13, 1883. The court held:
"A deed recorded after six months from
its execution has priority over a subsequent deed recorded within six months
from its execution, if the recording of the
first deed is prior in date to the recording
of the second deed."
The circumstances in that case were
even stronger than in the present case, for
the grantor remained in possession after
the first conveyance, and the grantee stood
by while the defendant company made
extensive improvements and expended a
large sum of money. Notwithstanding
this, the court held the grantee in the first
deed could recover the land in ejectment.
With these decisions before us, our individual opinion can have but little weight ;
there is but one thing to do, and that is, to
lay down the law as we find it.. lence,
taking these decisions as our guide, we hold
that the deed of Prentice has priority over
the deed of Lewis, even though he, Prentice, failed to get his deed on record within

FLYNx, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The Prentice deed was not recorded
within niuety days of its execution nor
was the Lewis deed. The former was
recorded at 8 a. in., on Dec. 22d, 1900, the
latter, on the same day, at 2 p. m. Had
the Lewis deed been recorded within the
ninety days, it would have been postponed. Gillespie v. Buffalo, etc., Railway
Co., 204 Pa. 107 ; Fries v. Null, 154 Pa.
573. A fortiori-rmust it be postponed,
since it was not recorded within the
statutory term.
The minute of the day at which a deed
is left for record is regarded. The recording at 8 a. m. is not to be deemed simultaneous with that at 2 p. m., on any theory
that the law will not cognize fractions of
a day.
Judgment affirmed.
GIBSON vs. GIBSON.
jectment by tenant in common-Right
of one tenant to eject the licensee of
another ex-tenant-Plaintiffmust show
title in himself.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

A widow leases a property composed of
a house and lot. She has four children.
She marries, gives birth to one child and
shortly after dies. A guardian has been
appointed for the four children. The
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father ("B") gives to the guardian a release of his right, title and interest, but he
still holds possession. One of the four
children ("A"), a daughter, marries.
She and her husband occupy the upstairs,
together with the three children, and the
father of the fifth child occupies the downstairs together with the said fifth child,
and refuses to vacate. The property is a
leasehold interest with five years notice to
quit. Ejectment by daughter against the
father.
EHLER for plaintiff.
The leasehold is personalty and descends
to husband and children in equal shares,
that is share and share alike. Act of 1848,
April 11.
In actions that savor of the realty tenants
in common must sue separately. Mobley
v. Bruner, 59 Pa. 481.
A tenant in common may recover his
individual interest in property by ejectment. Dawson v. Mills, 32 Pa. 302.
HEDGES for defendant.
The interests here being several and
distinct, the plaintiff herein cannot sue
in her own name for the entire possession
of the leasehold.
She can only recover her own individual share or interest
therein. Bennett v. Hethington, 16 S. &
R. 193.
Each tenant is considered to be solely
or separately seized of his share. 4 Kents
Commentaries, pages 368, 369.
Under the statute as to the descent of
personal property there is no distinction
between brothers and sisters of the whole
and the half blood.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

In an action of ejectment the plaintifi
will not be allowed to recover by showing
defects in the defendant's title, but he
must recover upon the strength and validity of his own title.
The property in dispute is a leasehold
interest-an estate for years-and being
personal property the unexpired term
vested in the distributees. Keating v.
Condon, 68 Pa. 75. This interest was
divided in accordance with the act of
April 11, 1848, Sec. 9, between the husband
and all the children share and share alike.
In this division the child of the second
marriage participated and took the same
share as the children under the first marriage. 2 Woodward 174. Subsequently,
the husband gave a release of all his right,
title and interest in the said estate to the
guardian of the four children, who thereby
acquire his portion. But he does not re-

lease his child's interest, nor does he reraise his purport to his child, and he, together with the child, occupies the lower
part of the house. One of the four children, a married daughter, brings this action to eject him. Can she maintain it?
The authorities are generally agreed
that ejectment will lie upon a right to an
estate for years. Heffner v. Betts, 32 Pa.
376. In White v. White (16 N. J. L. 202),
a room in a house was recovered in ejectment.
By virtue of the act of 1705, Sec. 2 (P.
& L. Digest Col. 4046), this widow's interest was held by the distributees as tenants
in common and not as joint-tenants.
Joint tenancies are not confined to real
property, but in Martin v. Smith (5 Binn.
22) it was distinctly held that personalty
might be held jointly. See also Goell v.
Morse, 126 Mass. 480. A tenancy in common arises where two or more persons
hold lands or tenements in fee simple, for
life or for years, by several and distinct
titles, and occupy thelands and tenements
in common. Unity of possession is all
that is required between tenants in common. Having several and distinct titles,
estates in common are subject to the same
disposition, incidents and charges as an
estate owned in severalty. 2 Boone on
Real Property 956; Tiedeman on Real
Property 199; 4 Kent 368; 2 Blackstone
191. Since all the tenants have separate
titles, i. e. hold their titles in severaltyit has been held by many of the courts
(though there is some dissension) that in
trespass, nuisance and for injuries to the
possession, the tenants must join in their
actions; Tiedeman on Real Property 200,
and the cases there cited ; 2 Black 192;
but that in real actions, as ejectment,
they must not join. 2 Boone on Real
Property 956; Johnson v. Sepulbeda, 5
Cal. 149. This is the rule in Pennsylvania. Our courts have held that whilea
tenant in common cannot maintain ejectment for the benefit of his co-tenants, he,
may, nevertheless, recover his aliquot
share. Mobley v. Bruner, 59 Pa. 481;
Dawson v. Mills, 32 Pa. 302; Jones v.
Methodist Church, 6 Forum 244. See
also Hayden v. Partison, 51 Pa. 261, and
Cook v. Brightly, 46 Pa. 439, which seem
to support this principle.
Having reached this conclusion are we
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now justified in entering judgment for
the plaintiff? Under the authorities she
has clearly established her right to sue
alone; but has she, under the facts of the
case, a right to demand that the defendant be ousted? We think not. Grant
her a recovery of her aliquot portion of the
house; what would it avail her? Can
she still show the defendant a trespasser?
Manifestly not. The plaintiff must in all
cases show a better title than the defendant and can only recover upon the
strength of her title. Her right extends
over a certain portion of the house and in
order to eject the defendant she must
show her right to the portion he occupies.
This she cannot do. In order to eject
the defendant, partition must first be had,
and the lower part allotted to her. Partition may be voluntary. Itmay beinpais.
It may be of personalty. It may be by
parol. 21 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law,
1139, et seq.; McKnight v. Bell, 135 Pa.
358. But here there is no indication of
such a parol partition, other than the fact
that the respective parties occupied certain
portions of the house. It does not appear
that this was in pursuance of an agreement, and we do not feel that weare justified in holding that a partition had been
had where one child occupies the lower
part of a house and four children the upper
part. The very inequality of the division
forbids us from presuming a partition.
Besides this, it must be remembered that
the child has certain rightsin this property.
He is a tenant in common with the other
four children, and is entitled to the same
rights and privileges as they are. In
McGarrod v. Murphy [1 Hilt. (N. Y. Com.
Pleas) 132, cited in 17 Am. & Eng. Encyc.
of Law, 671J, it was held a trespass for one
tenant in common to eject a person who is
on the premises by permission of another
co-tenant. This would imply that it is
not in the power of a tenant in common to
oust a licensee of a co-tenant. See Am. &
Eng. Encyc. of Law, supra. And what
is the father in this case if not a licenseepossessed of his child's permission ? The
father has certain rights in regard to the
child. He is its natural guardian ; is entitled to its custody, its earnings, and its
services. As its guardian he holds his
estate as trustee. In view of all this, plus
a natural desire of a child, evidently very
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young, to be with its father, are we not
justified in saying that he was upon the
premises with the permission of the child,
express or implied? If this were denied,
then the defendant's child might eject the
plaintiff's husband.
For these reasons, (a) that the plaintiff
has shown no title in herself to the part
occupied by the defendant, and (b) because
the defendant was upon the premises with
the permission of one of the co-tenants,
we enter judgment for the defendant.
CLAUDE T. RENO, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The leasehold on the death of the
lessee passed as assets to the administrator. The next of kin and husband
would have no right to it, unless, creditors
not needing it for the satisfaction of their
debts, the administrator consented that
they should take it. The evidence does
not disclose an absence of debts, nor the
consent of the administrator. The plaintiff and defendant both occupy the
house because of the sufferance of the
administrator. The latter alone, on the
facts exhibited, is entitled to oust either
of them by ejectment.
If there were no debts and the administrator consented to the taking of the leasehold by the distributees, they would, as
the learned court below says, be entitled
to. it as tenants in common. The husband has released to four of the five children, his sixth. The plaintiff is entitled
to J + J of J = J + 4 = t + j =--- ths.
She has a right to five twenty-fourths of
the downstairs as well as of the upstairs.
The youngest child has no right to the
exclusive possession of any single room of
the house; still less of any floor. Weshould
feel compelled to reverse the judgment of
the court below, and hold that the plaintiff was entitled to recover five twentyfourths of the downstairs, but for the want
of apparent title of any of the children
specifically to the leasehold. This view
was probably not presented to the learned
court below, whose able opinion is directed
to other aspects of the case.
Judgment affirmed.
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THU VORUM
JOHN BURTON vs. WILLIAM
COVERT

Mortgage--Bffect of mortgage executed

by the reversioner and the lessee for
years-Bight of subrogation- Who may
bring the action.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

C. Harrison held land in fee, subject to
a lease to Covert for twenty years. They
both united in a mortgage of.the land to
Chas. Nailor for $4,000. Subsequently a
judgment was recovered against Harrison
on another debt, and at. the sheriffis sale,
Burton became the purchaser. Nailor
threatening to enforce the mortgage,
Burton paid it, taking an assignment of it.
This is sci. fa. against Covert and Nailor.
GILLESPIE and HUBLER for plaintiff.

A mortgage does not necessarily merge
or become extinct by being united in the
same person with the fee. It may be kept
alive where suci is the intention or agreement of the parties, or where it would be
for the holders interest or advantage. P.
& L. Digest of Dec., Vol. 12, 20878;
Bispham's Equity, Sec. 160; Duncan v.
Dowry, 9 Pa. 32; Moore v. Harrisburg
Bank, 8 W. 138; Cook v. Brightly, 46 Pa.
489.
The law presumes an intention in accordance with the real interest of the
party. Denzler v. O'Keefe, 34 N. J. 361.
HILLYER and JACOBS for defendant.
When the owner of a fee takes on assignment of a first mortgage the legal
title and the mortgage merge and the
assignee of the mortgage can not sue on
the bond accompanying the mortgage.
Cowley's Appeal, I Grant 401; Protective
B. & L. Ass. Appeal, 12 Montg. Co 63.
When Burton paid the mortgage he did
that which, by the terms of the sale, he
was bound to do. It constituted part of
his bid and he had no legal right to use it
to divest an estate subject to which he
purchased the property. Hansel v. Lutz,
8 Harris 284; Bank v. Burns, 87 Pa. 491.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Win. Covert, owning a term of twenty
years, and C. Harrison, owner of the reversion in certain realty, desiring to raise
$4,000, both joined in a mortgage, covering
their combined interests, to Chas. Nailor.
On a judgment, recovered subsequently
against Harrison, and execution following, his equity of redemption was sold by
the sheriff to John Burton, who afterward
paid Nailor's mortgage and took an assignment of the same when foreclosure

was threatened. Burton has sued out a
scirefacias,making Covert and Nailor defendants.
There is no doubtconcerning Harrison's
ability to mortgage the fee, and, as bet~een the parties, Win. Covert's joinder
bound his term. Coble v. Nonemaker, 78
Pa. 501; Bismark Building and Loan Association v. Bolster, 92 Pa. 129.
At any time " after the expiration of
twelve months next ensuing the last day
whereon the said mortgage money ought
to" have been paid, Nailor could have
sued out a writ of scirefaciasonhis mortgage (Act of 1705, P. & L., Vol. 1, 1598),
and could have pursued his remedy in thesame manner as if Covert's interest had of
freehold instead of a leasehold. Act of
April 3, 1868; Hilton's Appeal, 116 Pa.
351. And Burton, asassignee of the mortgage, could have sued out a scirefacias in
his own name, or in the name of the mortgagee to his use (Act of April 22, 1863, P.
& L., Vol. 1, 1604), unless prevented by a
merger of the mortgage into the equity of
redemption in the fee already owned by
him.
But, though Burton, by taking an assignment of the mortgage, became both
mortgagor and mortgagee, yet no merger
would occur if such merger would be detrimental to the interests of'Burton (Moore
v. Harrisburg Bank, 8 Watts 138 ; Bryar's
Appeal, 111 Pa. 81 ; Carrow v. Headly, 155
Pa. 96) ; and Burton will not be presumed
to have intended a merger contrary to his
interests. Indeed, his taking an assignment instead of having satisfaction on the
record, shows an intention to keep the
mortgage in existence for some purpose.
Had the assignee of the mortgage pursued
the foreclosure proceedings by scirefacias
iii the nameofNailor, making himself and
Covert defendant., as the "real owners of
the land charged," all the interests covered by the mortgage could have been sold.
Moore v. Harrisburg Bank, 8 Watts 138;
Act of April 22, 1863, P. & L., Vol. 1, 1604;
Act of 1901, P. & L., 614, 1 Cl. 10. But in
that case an apportionment would have
been necessary ; and the same equitable
results may be attained by treating the
mortgage as extinguished so far as Burton's interest in reversion is concerned,
but as still in full force as to Covert's leasehold. This principle was applied by the
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Supreme Court of Massachusetts in Blodgett et al. v. Hildreth, 90 Mass. 186. The
SupremeCourtof Rhode Island, in Tillinghast v. Fry, 1 R.T. 53, says : "But because
he has an interest in preserving the mortgage disti net from the equity, to the extent
of the money advanced, for the redemption
of the other portion of the estate, and to
that extent alone, equity considers the
nmortgage assubsisting on the other portion
of the estate, for the purpose of compelling
contribution."
In our own case of Fisher v. Clyde, 1
Watts & Sergeant 544, the owner of the
equity of redemption in a portion of the
land charged with the payment of a
mortgage debt paid the whole mortgage,
took an assignment, and was allowed to
sue out a scire facias against the owners
of the remainder of the lands charged. It
is true that in these cases the mortgages
covered parcels of real estate in the hands
of separate owners in fee, but the equitable
principle governing the decisions is that
where one person pays the whole of a
mortgage debt, where another is also
bound, that other one should contribute
his just portion. We can see no reason
for not applying the same principle to the
present case where different estates in the
same parcel of land are bound by a mortgage entered into jointly by the owners of
such different estates.
The original mortgagee, Nailor, could
have maintained ejectment against Burton
and Covert, prior to the assignmentof the
mortgage to Burton, (Bower v. Fenn, 90
Pa. 359), and as assignee of the mortgage
Burton "stands in the shoes" of Nailor.
Earnest v. Hoskins, 100 Pa. 551. The enforcement of the same contribution by
Burton by scire facias sur mortgage cannot be complained of as an injury by
Covert. It may be well to notice, though
not raised on argument, that the Act of
1901, P. L. 614, Cl. 10, requires that the
real owners of the land charged shall be
made defendants to a scire facias sur
mortgage; but in the case at bar we regard
the mortgage as extinguished to the extent of Burton's interest, so that he is no
longer the owner of an interest charged.
Nailor, after his assignment to Burton,
lost all interest in the mortgage unless he
guaranteed the payment of the mortgage
debt, which does not appear. In any case
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Nailor can suffer no injury from being
made a defendant to the scirefacias.
The conclusion of the court is that
Burton could elect whether to consider
the mortgage as existing against the
whole estate, or as merged as to his estate
in reversion, as best suited his own interests, since, in either case, the position of
Covert and his liabilities are the same.
Hence, the scire facias was properly sued
out.
W. L. HOUCK, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

Covert and Harrison made a mortgage
which embraced the twenty years leasehold of the former, and the reversion or
remainder in fee of the latter. Harrison's
reversion was bought by Burton, subject
to the mortgage. Had the mortgage been
Harrison's only, it would have been Burton's duty to Harrison to pay it in full,
for he would have paid for the land at
sheriff's sale, as much less than if there
had been no mortgage, as the mortgage
amounted to. It would follow that as to
Harrison the mortgage, when subsequently paid by Burton, would be extinguished.
But the mortgage was made by Covert
as well as by Harrison. But how? Was
Covert surety for Harrison, or Harrison
for Covert? Or, were they co-principal
debtors? And if so, were they equal, or
unequal debtors? To these questions, the
evidence yields no answer. It is impossible to adopt any other practicable assumption, for the solution of the problem
before us, than that Burton paid for the
land what, had there been no mortgage,
he would have paid minus the whole
mortgage. The land, let us suppose, was
worth at the. sheriff's sale, in Burton's
estimation, $5,000. As the mortgage for
$4,000 would remain undivested, he would
be willing to pay in cash $1,000, and such
was in fact his bid. As he got $5,000
worth of land for $1,000 plus the mortgage,
it became his duty towards Harrison to
pay the mortgage. When he did pay it,
if there was any right of subrogation, that
right was not in him, but in Harrison.
Harrison could wield the mortgage for
the purpose of compelling an equitable
contribution from Covert. But, we have
no facts from which it might appear that
the debt was not wholly Harrison's, orif
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it was, in part, Covert's, to what extent
it was Covert's.
Burton is not the mortgagee if he is not
the proper use-plaintiff, and, it does not
•appear that Harrison could have maintained the action as use-plaintiff. We
think the learned court below was in
error in sustaining the action. Cf. Steele
v. Walker, 204 Pa. 257.
Judgment reversed.
JOHN H AMMER vs. LOUIS DAWSON
Trespass-Breach of borough ordinance
-Neligence-Remote and proximate
cause.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Hammer, working on the roof of a twostory house, slipped and fell to the ground.
Immediately, as he began to fall Dawson,
an occupant of the second floor, threw a
piece of furniture through the window
into the street, which struck Hammer in
the face and knocked out an eye. The fall
to the ground injured him but not seriously. The throwing of the article out of
the window was negligent because of the
likelihood that passengers on the paveinent would be injured. There was also
an ordinance of the city against throwing
anything out of the front windows.
KAUFMAN, DAVID
KOPF for plaintiff.

E., and

SCHWARTZ-

Ordinarily, what amounts to proximate
cause is a question for the jury, but where
the facts are undisputed, it becomes the
duty of the court to so instruct the jury.
Mack v. Lombard, 8 C. C. 3105; Hoag v.
R. R. Co., 4 Norris 293 ; Township v. Watson, 112 Pa. 574.
The result might have been foreseen, and
the causeof the injury is therefore proximate. Milwaukee R. R. Co. v. Kellogg,
94 U. S. 469 ; Pollock on Torts, p. 36.
Where an act is malum in se or willful,
the person guilty of it is liable for all the
consequences, however remote, because the
act is quasi criminal in its character, and
the law conclusively presumes that all the
consequences were foreseen and intended.
Brown v. State, 105 U. S. 249; Drake v.
Kiely, 93 Pa. 495.
RENO and SETZER for defendant.
The burden of proving negligence Is on
the plaintiff, and will not be presumed.
Brown v. Gilmore, 92 Pa. 40; Reese v.
Clark, 146 Pa. 465.
The negligent act of defendant must furtiler be shown to be the proximate cause
of theiujury. Brownfield v. Hughes, 128
Pa. 195.

If no proof of negligence be adduced, the
presumption is that the defendant is innocentof negligence. P. & R. R. R. Co. v.
Hummel, 44 Pa. 378.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

It is submitted by the counsel for the
defendant that there is no cause of action
shown, that the result was such as the defendant could not have foreseen and that
the injury sustained was not the proximate result, such as, according to common
experience of men, are likely to happen or
should be expected to happen. They
therefore urge that the maxim, " Causa
proxima, non remota .ectatur," applies.
Ordinarily, the question of what amounts
to proximate cause is for the jury, but
where there is an admitted and indisputable state of facts, it becomes the duty of
the court to determine whether the injury
was proximate or not. Mack v. Lombard,
8 Pa. C. C. R. 305; Hoag v. R. R., 85 Pa
293 ; Township v. Watson, 112 Pa. 574, and
cases cited.
Proximate cause has been defined as follows, in Hoag v. Lake Shore, etc., R. R.
Co., 85 Pa. 293, by Paxson, J. : "The true
rule is, that the injury must be the natural and probable consequence of the defendant's negligence, such a consequence
as, under the surrounding circumstances
of the case, might and ought to have been
foreseen by the wrong-dcer as likely to
flow from his act." Substantially the same
definition will be found in Milwaukee, etc.
R. R. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S.469 ; Wood,
v. R. R. Co., 36 W. N. C. 410; Pollock on
Torts, 36.
In the present case we do not think the
act of the defendant was such as he could,
or ought to have foreseen as likely to flow
from his conduct.
It is not such a probable or usual occurrence for a man to fall front a roof that the
defendant owed a duty to Hammer to look
upwards before putting the furniture out
of the window.
In explaining the rules of proximate
cause, Judge Orlady, in Swanson v. Crandall, 2 Sup. 85, remarks: "That natural
consequences of an act is the consequence
which ordinarily flows from it-the result
which may reasonably be anticipated from
it." Also Boutwright v. R. R. Co., 4 Sup.
274; Hockle v. Heating, 5 Sup. 21.
The counsel for plaintiff contends that
the act ix malum in se and the defendant
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is liable for all the consequences, however
remote, and citing Scott v. Shepherd, 2
Blk. 212. We cannot agree with this contention. In Scott v. Shepherd the throwing of the lighted squib into the crowded
market was such a malicious, willful and
mischievous act that the law will conclusively presume that all the consequences
were foreseen and intended. While in
the present case there is no such evidence.
The act was only forbidden by an ordinance, and If no proof of negligence be
produced the presumption is that the
defendant is innocent. P. & R. R. R. Co.
v. Hummel,44 Pa. 878. The presumption
is always that the defendant will perform
his duty. 2 Bouvier's Law Dictionary
479.
The breach of the ordinance might expose to the imposed penalty, but give no
right of action to Hammer. Even though
a valid municipal ordinance requires
Dawson to refrain from putting his furniture out of the window, it would not result
that a duty would be thereby created toward Hammer. Hartford v. Talcott, 48
Conn. 525, also 18 W. N. C. 7. Brown v.
R. R. Co.; 22 N. Y. 191, and 123 N. Y. 405.
Another essential of a negligent act is
that the person committing it must owe
some legal duty to the person on whom
the injury is inflicted, as stated in opinion
of Ewing v. Pittsburg, C. & St. L. R. R.,
147 Pa, 43. The duty which is violated
must be something more than a general
duty to the public. Itmustbea dutydue
direct from the wrongdoer to the injured
party. 7 Met. (Mass.), 276 and 107 Pa. 580.
As long as Hammer was on the roof
Dawson did not owe a special duty, and
the falling of Hammer being unusual and
not what Dawson, or an ordinary man in
like circumstances, according to common
experience, and usual course of events,
should expect to happen. And he cannot
be held answerable to Hammer in damages
for the injuries sustained. We, therefore,
instruct the jury to render a verdict for
the defendant.
ARTHUR L. REESER, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The charge of the learned court below
sufficiently justifies itself. It may have
been a negligent act to throw a piece of
furniture through the window into the
street. There was danger in it to passen-
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gers on the street, and had one of these
been hurt, he would probably have had a
cause of action. It is, however, quite unusual for men to fall from roofs, and it
would hardly be permissible for a jury to
say that Dawson should have realized the
possibility that some one was falling, and
for that reason should have refrained from
casting an article through the window,
that might strike him. C. Elliott v.
Allegheny County Light Co., 204 Pa. 568.
Judgment affirmed.
BROOKE vs. SEJONE.
Assumpsit on promissory note.-Liability
of accommodation endorser-Ignorance
of the endorser of the presence of an
existing debt owed by the maker no excuse.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Win. Barry had borrowed $4,000 from
Brooke, giving as collateral security what
purported to be a mortgage by 3. Hooper
of the land of the latter. Brooke discovering the forgery threatened to prosecute
Barry for forgery unless he produced
other security. Barry and Brooke then
called on Sejone, a friend of Brooke, and
asked him to become security for him by
endorsing two notes for $2,000 each for hiR.
accommodation. Nothing was said about
the existing debt or the forgery. Two
notes were drawn payable to Sejone and
by him endorsed to Brooke. They were
renewed at intervals of three months for
eighteen months, when Sejone refused to
renew or pay, alleging that the pre-existing debt and the forgery had been concealed from him. It was not until the
first renewal had been made that Sejone
learned of these facts. Assumpsit on endorsement.
HENNEKE and Fox for plaintiff.
When a note is not endorsed in the
ordinary course of business, nor for value,
but at the maker's request and for his
benefit, the endorsement is an accommodation endorsement for the maker. Peeble
v. Addicks, 174 Pa. 543; Newbold v.
Boraef, 155 Pa. 227.
The holder of an accommodation note
can pledge it for an old debt, have it discounted, and is not restricted in any manner as to its use. Lentheim v. Wilmirding, 55 Pa. 75; Lord v. Bank, 20 Pa. 384;
Moore v. Baird, 30 Pa. 138.
Having learned of the forgery and still
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continuing to renew the note he is estopped from setting up the forgery. Iron
City Bank v. Fort Pitt Bank, 159 Pa. 46.
HEDGxs and JAcoBs for defendant.
The endorsement by Sejone was procured fraudulently and Brooke was a
party to the fraud. The debt was not contracted contemporaneously, but preexisted; therefore no consideration passed
between Brooke and Sione. Rogers v.
Keystone Bank, 83 Pa. 248; Maynard v.
Bank, 98 Pa. 250; Cozen v. Middleton, 118
Pa. 622; Cummings v. Boyd, 83 Pa. 372;
Paxton v. Nields; 137 Pa. 385.
Renewing without a new consideration
does not change it a particle from the original; it does not make Brooke a bonafide
holder for value. Maynard v. Bank, 98 Pa.
2.50; Tasker's Estate, 182 Pa. 122; Carpenter
v. Bank, 106 Pa. 170; Kirkpatrick v. Muerhead, 4 Harris 117.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

question will be dwelt with immediately.
There is nothing in the statement of facts
to make one absolutely certain that fraud
did exist. To constitute fraud there must
be in the mind of one person an intention
to take advantage of another person of inferior knowledge on a certain subject and
this intention must be carried into effect.
In this case nothing appears to show that
it was the intention of Brooke and Barry
to defraud Sejone; probably they thought
it immaterial that Sejone should know of
the former transaction and this without
any intention to defraud. But giving the
greatest strength possible to the defendant's position and admitting that Barry
and Brooke were guilty of fraud, nevertheless, in the opinion of the court, this
cannot be used as a defence at the present
time. Sejone relinquished this right by
his action in renewing the notes. If
Sejone had declared that he would not be
held liable onthe notes as soon as he became aware of the existence of fraud he
would have had a good defence, but by his
action of renewing the notes five times
after he became aware of the fraud, lie is
estopped from setting u'p fraud as against
these notes, accordingly judgment is entered for the plaintiff for the full amount
of the notes.
HASSERT, J.

In the case at hand there are two questions involved, first: "Was Sejone an accommodation endorser?" and, second
"If Sejone was an accommodation endorser
is hie contract void on the ground of
fraud?" We will deal with these questions in the order stated. The learned
counsels for the defendant have cited various cases to prove that Sejone was not an
accommodation endorser. In the opinion
of the court the cases so quoted do not contain the rule as recognized in Pennsylvania
courts to-day. Although they may hold
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
that an accoimmodation note is a loan of
Brooke was under a duty not to accept
the matker's credit without restriction as
the notes of Sejone, as security for the
to the manner of its'use, etc., nevertheless,
the court, depending upon its own inves- debt. of Barry, without disclosing to
tigation, belie es that the rul e as recog- Sejone the facts of Barry's forgery.
nized in the Commonwealth of Pennsyl- Knowledge of that fact would have been
to Sejone important, and he was about
vania at the present day is contained in
the case of Carpenter v. Republic Nat. assuming the relation of surety. He had
Bank, 106 Pa. 170, which defines accom- a right therefore to the divulgation to
modation paper as that which is made by him, by Brooke, of this fact.
So much the learned court below seems
one party for the benefit of another without consideration; it represents the loan of to concede, but it holds that Sejone has
credit. This is the general rule through- lost the right to insist on the nonout the country and no exception is made disclosure of the facts to him as a defense,
where the note is given for a specific or because, with full knowledge of them, he
defined purpose. The state of affairs does has renewed the notes five times. It
not, in the opinion of the court, alter the does not appear that Brooke's position
character of the instrument. The correct would be any worse, were Sejone exonerrule may be found in Norton on Bills and ated after the fifth renewal, than if the
Notes, p. 176. On these grounds the couft latter had been exonerated after the first
has decided that Sejone was an accommo- renewal. It is not *manifest that had
dation endorser and consequently he is Sejone declined to renew the notes, after
liable to the plaintiff unless the contract. learning of the forgery, Brooke could
be void on the ground of fraud. This have recovered any more of his debt than
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he could now recover, were Sejone discharged. The principle would be entirely sensible, that Sejone could not now
escape, unless it was clear that his escape
would not cause a loss to Brooke, which
he would not have suffered, had Sejone
been prompter in repudiating any obligation. It is not so satisfactory, to affirm
that although Brooke is known to have
lost nothing by reason of Sejone's delay,
that delay shall bind on Sejone a duty
from which, but for it, he would be free.
There are cases however, e. g., Dunn v.
Columbia National Bank, 204 Pa. 53,
which seem to hold that Sejone's recognitions of a duty after he obtained knowledge of the facts, would deprive him of
the right to avoid payment on account of
them, irrespective of any ifijury to Brooke
that would arise on account of the tardiness of his repudiation. In recognition of
these cases,
Judgment affirmed.
WILLIAM CHURCH vs. ADAM
SALONY.
Estates upon condition-Conditions subsequent-Conditionsprecedent.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Church conveyed a lot in the borough
to John Sharkey "to have and to hold to
him and his heirs for the purpose of erecting on it a school and of maintaining instruction therein." Sharkey never built
the school. Three years after the deed to
him he conveyed the lot to Salony, who
has since erected, three years ago, a dwelling house he continues to occupy. Church
now brings ejectment against Salony for
the recovery of the property.
TYLER and MENGES for plaintiff.

The policy of the law is to render alienation of lands as free as possible, and conditions are not favored in the courts especiaUy conditions subsequent. Clark v.
Martin, 49 Pa. 289; First M. E. Church of
Columbia v. Old Columbia Public Ground
Co., 103 Pa. 608, 4 Kent Com. 131; Bishop
on Contracts 132; Parmelee v. Oswego El.
R. R. Co., 6 N. Y. 80; Davis v. Lyman, 6
Com. 252; Myers v. Burns, 33 Barb. 401:
Pathbon v. Tioga Nay. Co., 2 W. &S. 74;
1 Washburn on Real Prop. 447.
The provisions essential to constructing
this as a condition are not present and it
cannot be so construed. Groves et al. v.
Deterling et al., 120 N. Y. 457; Cook v.
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Trimble, 9 Watts 16; Tiedemati on Real
Property, 191; Mary A. Kirchline App.
v. Harring, 189 Pa. 560.
PAK and LONG for defendant.
Ejectment may be brought any time on
breach of a condition subsequent. Hayden
v. Staughten, 5 Pick 529.
The words used in this deed must be
construed as a condition subsequent.
Tiedeman on Renl Property, 225; Kirk
v. King, 3 Pa. 436; Upington v. Corrington, 151 N. Y. 143.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

This is an action of ejectment by
Church to recover from defendant the
possession of a piece of land which plaintiff had conveyed to one John Sharkey,
"to have and to hold, to him and his
heirs for the purpose of erecting on it a
school and maintaining instruction therein." Sharkey did not build the school
house, and three years after the land had
been conveyed, he sold it to Salony, the
defendant in this action, who has erected
thereon a dwelling house which he now
occupies,
The decision of the case depends upon
the construction to be given to the clause
"to have and to hold to him and his heirs
for the purpose of erecting on it a school
and maintaining instruction therein."
The plaintiff contends that the clause
creates a condition subsequent, for a
breach of which he has a right of re-entry;
the defendant.argues that the clause Is
a covenant, and that there is no right of
re-entry.
An estate upon condition is defined to be
"one which may be created, enlarged or
.defeated by the happening or not happening of some contingent event." 2 Blackstone's Commentaries, 152.
A condition subsequent is one which
does not necessarily precede the vesting of
the estate, but may accompany or follow
it. But conditions subsequent are not
favored in law, and are construed strictly
for the reason that they tend to destroy
estates. Sharon Iron Co. v. Erie, 41 Pa.
St. 341.
In McKnightv. Krentz, 54 Pa. St. 232,
the couit says: "Conditions that work forfeitures are notfavorites of the law, and
nothing less than a clear expression of intention that a provision shall be such will
make it a condition upon which the continuation of an estate granted depends."
In Cook v. Trimble, 9 Watts 16, the lan-
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guage is, that "The intent to create a condition must be not only clear, but, in a
deed, expressed in apt words."
The words used in the deed in question
are "to have and to hold . . . for the purpose of erecting a school," etc. Are these
words to be so construed, that, upon a
non-compliance therewith by the grantee,
his estate will be defeated? We think not.
The words do not show a clear intention
to create a condition subsequent, and a
condition will not be raised by implication
from a mere declaration in a deed that the
grant is made for a special purpose, without being coupled with words appropriate
to make such a condition. Packard v.
Ames, 16 Gray (Mass.), 327; Barker v.
Bowers, 138 Mass. 580.
That there was no clear intention to create a condition subsequent is evidenced
by the fact that no provision is made for a
forfeiture or a termination of the estate, in
case the provisions of the clause were not
complied with. No right of re-entry was
reserved by the grantor on any contingency.
The authorities show that the recital of
the consideration, and a statement of the
purpose for which the land is to be used,
are wholly insufficient to create a conditionalestate. The obligation of the vendee
was, at most, a covenant. See the Methodist Episcopal Church v. the Ground
Company, 103 Pa. St. 608.
Judgment
will, therefore, be for the defendant.
SMITH, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The conveyance to Sharkey was to him
and his heirs "for the purpose of erecting
on it (the premises) a school and maintaining instruction therein."
Sharkey
has not built the school house, and, three
years having elapsed, since thecon veyance
to him, he has conveyed the land in fee to
Salony, who has erected on it a dwelling
house.
There is no collateral limitation that the
land shall be used for school purposes, and
no cessation of such use. Cf. Henderson
v. Hunter, 59 Pa. 335.
Not enough of the conveyance to
Sharkey and of the circumstances of its
making appears to justify us in saying
that he received it in trust to erect and
maintain a school upon the land. But,
even if it did, such a trust is not the

equivalent of a condition. The cestui que
trust might vindicate the trust, but the
grantor could not resume possession. Cf.
Soller's Church Petition, 139 Pa. 61.
The declaration in the deed, of the purpose to which the grantor or grantee intends the land to be devoted, does not
make the devotion of it to this purpose a
condition subsequent. M. E. Church of
Columbia v. Old Columbia Public Ground
Co., 103 Pa. 608; Wilkesbarrev. Wyoming
Society, 134 Pa. 616; Rankin Regular
Baptist Church v. Edwards, 204 Pa. 216;
though the prohibition in the deed of any
other use than that named, would. Kirk
v. Kink, 3 Pa. 436; Schultz v. Fitzwater,
5 Pa. 126.
The purpose that the land shall be
used for the erection of a school house is
clearly expressed. The implication that
any other use is forbidden is not sufficiently
cogent to become a condition. Clogs on
alienation are not looked on with favor,
and they must be explicitly created.
Judgment affirmed.
FULMER vs. ADAMS COAL CO.
Right of co-tenant in leasehold after refusal to co-operate with the co-tenantsBill in equityfor accounting,under Act
25th, April, 1850-Duty of the court.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Fulmerandsix others, intending to form
a corporation for the trading of coal, obtained a lease of coal land for fifty years,
in which it was stipulated that they were
to pay 50 cents per ton royalty for all coal
taken out. and that they were to take out
and pay for annually at least 5,000 tons.
For some reason, Fulmer became dissatisfied with the proposed operations of his
associates, and refused to unite with them
in obtaining the incorporation.
They, however, obtained the charter,
and, entering in the premises, dug and
took away coal. They have at all times
been willing to allow Fulmer the number
of shares agreed upon, and to give him his
share of the profits, on his paying for them.
He files this bill to enjoin against the further prosecution of the business, and also
for an accounting.
The master recommends a perpetual injunction, and allows a compensation for
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Fulmer's shares of coal taken out, its value
at the mine's mouth less the cost of taking
it from its original place and putting it
there. Exceptions.
EHLER and CAREY for plaintiff.
A tenant in common may demand an
accounting for all coal taken out amcording
to the respective proportions and interests
to which they are entitled in the land.
Coleman's Appeal, 62 Pa. 252.
The fact that Fulmer refused to join in
the incorporation is no bar to equitable
relief. Muncy Traction Engine Co. v.
De La Green, 143 Pa. 269; Garret v. Dillsburg & Mechanicsburg R. R. Co., 78 Pa.
465.
MCNEIL and BARNHART for defendants.
One co-tenant cannot make his own
omission to occupy the joint estate, a
ground of action against his co-tenant.
Boyer v. Holmes, 6 Gray 118.
The plaintiff cannot sustain his injunction unless he can show fraud or acts
ultra vires, and the burden of proof is
on plaintiff to show this. Malone v.
Lancaster Gas Co., 182 Pa. 309.
He who seeks equity must do equity.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
Fulmer and six others, intending to
form a corporation for the mining of
coal, obtained a lease of coal land for fifty
years, in which it was stipulated that they
were to pay fifty cents per ton royalty, for
all coal taken out, and pay for annually
at least 5,000 tons. For some reason
Fulmer became dissatisfied with the proposed operations of his associates, and refused to unite with them in obtaining the
incorporation. They, however, obtained
the charter,and entering upon the premises
dug and took away coal. They have at all
times been willing to allow Fulmer the
number of shares agreed upon and to give
him his share of the profits on his paying
for them. He files this bill to enjoin against
the further prosecution of the business and
asks for an accounting; the master recommends a perpetual injunction and allows
a compensation for Fulmer's share of coal
taken out, its value at the mine's mouth,
less the cost of taking it from its original
place and putting it there. Exceptions.
That Fulmer and the six others who
leased the coal land and are parties
in this proceeding are co-tenants of the
coal lands, ought to be considered as a point
settled beyond dispute. The fact that six
of the same original co-tenants have
formed a corporation does not materially

4'

alter the facts of the case. The corporation and Fulmer became the co-tenants.
Ever since estates in common have been
known in the law it has been the unquestionable legal right of a tenant in
common, one of his essential proprietary
rights, to occupy, use and enjoy the coinmon property without liability to account
to his co-tenants so long as he does not
prevent them from exercising the same
right. This land was leased for the sole
purpose of mining coal and the rent was
to be paid on the amount of coal mined
and a certain amount was to be mined
each year. In order that the rent be paid
and not paid directly from the pockets
of the seven co-tenants, it was necessary
that the proposed corporation he formed
and the land operated. Six of the seven
proceeded under the original plan upon
which the land was leased. Fulmer, the
seventh, refuses to enterinto theoperation
of the land and in as much as the other
co-tenants stand willing that he should
come in and have equal enjoyment of the
land with them in the manner in which
the land was to be used, we think acts as
a bar against him. Sec. 12 Col. 414 and
73 Am. Dec. 550, it has been held that the
neglect of a co-tenant to enter into equal
enjoyment at any moment may be regarded as an assent to the sole occupation
of the others. The six men who have
formed the corporation have in no way
attempted to oust Fulmer from the land,
but ask that he pay for his share of the
stock. This is certainly equitable and as
they stand at all times ready to allow him
to come in and enjoy with them the benefits
of the land upon his paying his share we
cannot see that lie has any grounds upon
which to base his claim.
In 30 Md. 120 and 96 Am. Dec. 571, it
was stated that co-tenants being jointly
seized of the entire estate, each has an
equal right of entry and possession and
the entry and possession of one will be
presumed to be in accordance with his
title, such presumption holding until some
notorious and unequivocal act of exclusion
occurs. Upon these grounds we contend
that Fulmer has not done his part in the
agreement and the court sees no reason
why his prayer for an injunction should
be granted.
Furthermore, we see no reason for an
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accounting being made to him in that he
has invested no money in the land or the
operations which have been begun upon
the land. Had he money invested or been
refused the privilege of investing money,
an entirely different view of the matter
would present itself. We cannot see where
he has any claim at all upon the corporation which is his co-tenant under the lease,
and it has been held in 29 Mo. 356 that
where one co-tenant, occupying the whole
estate without claim on the part of his cotenant, is under no obligation to account.
In view of the facts existing the court
dismisses the bill.
E. F. HELLER, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

Fulmer and six others acquired a lease
of the coal land for fifty years. The price
they were to pay was a royalty of 50 cents
per ton on the coal taken out, and not less
than 5,000 tons were to be taken out in
any one year. Fulmer, therefore, became
owner of an undivided seventh of the land
for the term. That no cash was paid for
the lease could not affect his estate. He
practically agreed to pay his seventh, at
future annual periods, In sums to be ascertained by future events; but a man becomes none the less an owner of land because the payment of the price is postponed, or its amount is variable and contingent.
The coal lease was of no value except for
the purpose of selling it,.or of extracting
and selling the coal. The six associates
proposed to extract and sell the coal, but
Fulmer declined to unite with them in the
enterprise. They became, for this purpose,
a corporation; but he refused to take any
shares in it. What, then, was to be done?
Must the six allow their leasehold to lie
unused, because their co-tenant was unwilling to co-operate with them?
But, when these six, as they had a right
to do, undertook to operate the coal mine,
at their own expense, they necessarily took
out not six-sevenths, but seven-sevenths,
of the coal that wasremoved. One of these
sevenths belonged to Fulmer. The act of
April 25, 1850, 1 P. & L. 717, gives to him
a right to file a bill in equity for an account, and directs the court to make such
decree "as may appertain to justice and
equity ;" and to ascertain how much coal,
etc., has been taken out, "and the sum

that may bejustly and equitably due" from
the defendant to the plaintiff, according to
their "respective proportions and interests." Under this act, Fulmer had a right
to file the bill, and to obtain an accounting.
Nothing appears indicating that he had
a right to prevent the prosecution of the
work by the defendants. He made no
effort himself to operate the mine. He
had no right to require the defendants to
let it lie idle. The utmost that he could
ask was an equitable share of what was
produced.
It was error in the learned court below
to dismiss the plaintiff's bill. The defendants have appropriated to themselves
a seventh of all-the coal taken by them,
belonging to the plaintiff, he is entitled
to the value of it. But, the value where?
In its native place? or, after labor has
been expended on it, in bringing it to the
mine's mouth? or to some market more
or less distant? It is plain that Fulmer
should have the value of the coal in its
native place. All other additional value
is the product, not of his contract with
his lessor, but of the skill, expenditure,
and effort of the defendants. In this product he has no right to share.
How is the value of the coal in place
to be ascertained? Not by subtracting
from the price obtainable for the coal at
the top of the mine, or in the nearest coal
market, the cost of placing it there,
for that would be to give Fulmer a share
of the profits. Between the value of the
coal in place, and its price in the
market, lies, not only the cost, but also
the profits of the enterprise.
The value of the coal in the place is the
price that could be got for it, i. e., the
value of the coal lease. Like the value of
anything else, this must be ascertained by
the opinion of competent judges, or by
evidence of what similar coal leases sell
for. It will be the duty of the court
below to hear evidence as to this value of
the coal place, and to award to Fulmer
one seventh of it, with interest from the
time of the defendant's appropriation of it.
Cf. Fulmer's Appeal, 128 Pa. 24; Coal Co.
v. R. R. Co., 187 Pa. 145.
Decree reversed and bill reinstated with
procedendo.
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DUNBAR vs. DUNBAR.
Assumpsit for back annuitiy-Husband
and wife-Contract in consideration of
separation-"
1_aintenance"I defined.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Plaintiff and defendant being married,
had agreed to separate, the defendant
agreeing to pay plaintiff an annuity of
$500 "during her life, or until she remarries, having obtained a divorce." The
defendant became a bankrupt, and is discharged under Federal Act. This is an
action to recover a back annuity, the
plaintiff neither having obtained a divorce
nor re-married. Defendant sets up his
discharge in bankruptcy.
PRIOKETT for plaintiff.

A discharge in bankruptcy is not a releagse of liability for maintenance or support of wife or child. Par. 2, sec. 17, Fed.
Act. 1898, and amendment Feb. 5, 1903.
Coiitraet of husband is a maintenance;
he is bound by law to support his wife.
The discharge of a contingent debt is
not within the meaning of the statute of
1898, the act applying only to all provable
debts and no method being laid down by
which a contingent debt could be ascertained.
SMITH for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Plaintiff and defendant, being married,
had agreed to separate, the defendant
agreeing to pay plaintiff an annuity of
$500 during her life or until she remarried or having obtained a divorce.
The defendant became a bankrupt and is
discharged under the Federal Act. This
is an action to recover a back annuity,
the plaintiff having neither obtained a
divorce nor re-married. Defendant sets up
his discharge in bankruptcy.
In England deeds in the form of articles
of separation were once held to be contra
bonos mores, and courts of equity refused
to carry them into effect. But judicial
opinion has undergone a change and it is
now well settled in England that such
deeds are not against public policy.
In Pennsylvania, as early as 1846, the
doctrine was deemed well settled that
separation deeds are valid and effectual,
both at law and in equity, provided their
objects be actual and immediate and not
contingent on future separation.
In Scott's Estate, 147 Pa. 102, the court

said: "It is settled law in this State that
an agreement between husband and wife
to live separate and apart, if based upon
a good consideration and reasonable terms,
will be valid and binding." So the only
question left for the court is, whether this
annuity was discharged in bankruptcy.
amended
Section 17 of chapter II,
by act of 1903, provides: "Debts not affected by a discharge," and among other
debts are maintenance; "(2) for alimony,
due or to become due, orfor maintenance
or support of wife or child * * ..1,
The question now presents itself, does
this annuity of $500 come within the
meaning of either of the terms "alimony,"
"maintenance," or "support?'"
First as to alimony: Alimony as defined by Bouvier is "the allowance
which a husband by order of court, pays
to his wife living separate from her for
her maintenance." Standard Dictionary:
"The allowance made a woman by order
of court * * * after divorce or legal
separation." In 16 Gray 110, the husband entered into an agreement with his
wife for aseparation, and gave a bond to a
third party to secure performance by him,
and to pay a certain sum by way of alimony for her support and maintenance
during the existence of the coverture between them. Held, That the word alimony is not used in its technical signification, for what she received is to be enjoyed by her or disposed of for the maintenance of herself and daughter. It is therefore to be received by her rather as an
annuity than as an alimony.
Alimony does not arise from any business transaction, but from the relation of
marriage. It is not founded on contract,
express or implied, but on the natural and
legal duty of the husband to support the
wife. The general obligation to support
is made specific by the decree of the court
of appropriate jurisdiction.
Barber v.
Barber, 21 How. 582.
Counsel for the plaintiff seems to lay
great stress upon the words "maintenance
or support." Maintenance, as defined by
Black, is "sustenance, support, assistance."
"TheTurnishing by one person to
another, for his support, of the means of
living, or for clothing, shelter, etc., particularly when the legal relation of the
parties is such that one is bound to sup-
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port the other as between father and
child, or husband and wife." Surely the
legislature never contemplated giving this
fl'rm "maintenance" such a broad meanbhig.
If this were true, one could
hardly conceive how it would be possible
For a man to obtain a discharge in
bankruptcy, covering sufficient ground
to enable him to again embark in a
business enterprise free from any liabilities of his former debts.
We are of
opinion that such was not the intention
of the framers of the act, but rather intended this term to be used in its more
restricted sense. Bouvier says: "Mainteiiance is aid, support, assistance. The
support which one person who is bound b,#
law to do so, gives to another."
It is a well defined principle of law
when a wife is living apart from her husband, when a husband neglects to provide for, or support his wife, the wife has
a right to pledge his credit for necessaries;
although the husband will not be liable
for necessaries purchased by his wife if
he shows that credit was given to the wife
herself or that she has a sufficient separate
income. It is likewise well settled that there
is an obligation of a parent to support his
child, until the child is in a condition to
provide for its own maintenance, and no
further. Debts of this character would seem
to be more in line with the legislature's
meaning of the clause excepting debts for
"maintenance or support."
In Vale (96
Feed. Rep. 964) "The court held that judgment against a father for support of a
bastard child can not be proved as a debt
in bankruptcy," Nowhere in the act do
we find this debt expressly exempted, so
the clause "maintenance or support of a
child" must be construed to mean such.
In State v. Belty, 61 Iowa 307, the defendant was charged with bastardy. Complaint was filed before child was born. The
child was delivered dead. The State asks
at the trial for judgment for expenses of
medical attendance and other lying in
expenses, contending the law charged the
defendant with the maintenance of child.
Court said "maintenance was aid, support,
assistance, which one person bound by law
to do so, gives to another for his living.
Held: as child was not born alive there
was never any person for whose maintenance the defendant could be charged."

This only adds to the long line of authorities which seem to hold that the real
meaning of "maintenance" is "that which
under the law a person is bound to give
for support." The agreement to pay the
$500 annuity was a contract, pure and
simple, founded upon sufficient consideration, a specific ascertained sum designated,
an agreement in consideration of living
apart he was to pay the annuity. Now
suppose, as counsel for the plaintiff would
have us believe, that this was for maintenance, then maintenance and annuity
would be synonymous; yet for a failure to
pay the annuity an action for breach of
the contract would hold, while if the
action was to be called maintenance only,
an action or implied contract for necessaries could be sustained-one a recovery
for $500, the other for actual necessaries
furnished and needed by a woman in her
station. It seems inconsistent to hold
that the two are synonymous. Then
again, while we do not lay much stress on
this, yet it has been held in 159 Mass. 474,
that "money was not to be regarded as
necessaries"-"at law it is entirely clear
that a married woman has no right to
borrow money on her husband's credit
even for the purchase of necessaries." So
if money is not classed among necessaries,
in an action for maintenance, which is
based on necessaries, the sum could not be
recovered.
In view of the above argument, we
are of opinion that this debt does not come
within the meaning of the act and a discharge in bankruptcy is a good defence to
the action.
While the court is cognizant of the
dearth of authority on this subject, yet It is
to be regretted that the brief of the counsel
for the defendant has been of little or no
assistance to the court in determining this
question. Judgment for defendant.
LANARD, J.
OPINION OF TIE SUPREME COURT.

The aotion is assumpsit on case stated,
reserving the right to appeal and to writ
of error. The facts show an express contract. The action is to recover "a back
annuity," whether accruing before or after
the filing of the petition in bankruptcy,
is not said. This may vitally affect the
plaintiff's right of recovery in this case.
We shall consider this later. As to the
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validity of this agreement of separation,
whatever may be the result of the vacillation of the English courts in their
treatment of similar contracts, we agree
with the learned court below that the
agreement in question is not contrary to
the law of their State. Hutton v. Hutton,
3 Pa. 100. The principal question to be
treated is as to the effect of the plea of a
discharge in bankruptcy. According to
our interpretation of the agreement and
the law applicable thereto, this depends
wholly upon the time the annuity sued
for became due and payable. At the end
of each year, a certain sum of money
would fall due the plaintiff under the
terms of the agreement. Now did the sum
sued for in this case fall due before or
after the filing of the petition in bankruptcy? Let us suppose the sum fell due
before the filing of the petition. The
question then is, could the claim be proved
in bankruptcy and if so would it also be
discharged? The Federal Act of 1898
defines "debt" as any debt, demand or
claim provable in bankruptcy, (sec. 1,
supra. 11) and a "discharge" in bankruptcy as meaning the release of a bankrupt from all of his debts which are provable in bankruptcy, except such as are excepted by the act, (sec. 1, supra, 12). A
claim may therefore be proved in bankruptcy and share in the dividends but not
be affected by a discharge as to the balance. A provable claim is not always
dischargeable, but a dischargeable claim
is always provable. Sec. 63 of the act
gives the list of the debts which may be
proved against a bankrupt estate and
among that list we find (supra. 4) debts
,founded upon an open account, or upon a
contract, express or implied. The debt here
is upon an express agreement of separation
and would undoubtedly fall within the
meaning of this section and would therefore be a claim provable in bankruptcy.
Now as to the effect of a discharge
granted. By the terms of the certificate
of discharge (Forum No. 59) the bankrupt
is discharged from all debts and claims
provable and which existed on the day
the petition for adjudication was filed,
e@cept such debts as are by law excepted
from the operation of a discharge in bankruptcy. Sec. 17 zives a list of the debts
not affected by a discharge and among

others (supra2) are liabilities for alimony,
due or to become due, or for maintenance,
or support of wife or child. The question
may now be raised whether the claim
under consideration comes within the
meaning of alimony, or of maintenance,
or of support. "Alimony does not arise
from any business transaction, but from
the relation of marriage. It is not founded
on contract express or implied, but on the
natural and legal duty of the husband to
support the wife." Gray, J. Audubonv.
Shufield, 181 U. S. 575. It was held in
this case that alimony was not provable
in bankruptcy or barred by a discharge.
Certainly our claim would not come
within the definition of alimony. We
agree with the learned colirt below in
holding that the words alimony, maintenance and support all have reference to
such obligations as were enforced at common law under the common courts and
not to an obligation assumed by expre;s
contract. In fact upon close reading of this
particular subsection it will be noted that
every liability mentioned is of this character. It is evident, therefore, from the
above argument that the claim as presumed was not only provable but dischargeable in bankruptcy. The plea would
then be good. Suppose the annuity fell
due after the filing of the petition? Then
by the very terms of the discharge it
would not be affected. (Form No. 59).
What is not provable is not dischargeable.
Why is not the entire agreement or contract for annuities due and to become due
provable and dischargeable in bankruptcy?
Upon inspection of see. 63, it will be found
that no express provision is made for the
proving of contingent claims, and our
contract, except for the sums actually
due, is entirely contingent. How can we
tell the length of life of plaintiff, or
whether she may not break the provision
of the agreement by either marriage after
defendant's death or divorce during his
lifetime?
Herein the act of 1898 is radically
different from the previous bankruptcy
laws of 1844 and 1867. Both the latter
acts provided expressly for the proving of
contingent claims and a calculation of
their present value. Sec. 19, act 1867.
*Willistown cases, Bankruptcy p. 49. Act
of 1841, 5 stat. at L. 445, chap. 9. Owing
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to what has been said to be inadvertence
upon the part of the framers to provide
expressly in the present act for such claims,
divergent views upon the subject have
been expressed by various courts of bankruptcy. In Mock v. Market St. Nat.
Bank. 107 Fed. Rep. 897, the bankrupt was
indoser of commercial paper not due at the
time of the filing of the petition, it was held
that under see. 60 a, sub-sec. 4, the creditor
might prove against the estate of the
bankrupt after the liability had become
fixed. A similar view was expressed in
Cobb v. Overman, 54 L. R. A. 809, respecting an annuity bond given by the bankrupt. Cases contra to the above will be
found in In re. Schaefer, 104 Fed. Rep.
973, and Goding v. Rosenthal, 61 N. E. R.
222. A recent case, Dunbar v. Dunbar,
23 Sup. Ct. R. 757, throws some light
upon the question. The bankrupt had
made an agreement with his divorced
wife to pay a certain annuity "during her
life or until she re-marries." Held, a discharge in bankruptcy did not affect the
obligation. "Conceding that the bankruptcy act provides for discharging some
classes of contingent demands or claims,
this is not, in our opinion, such a demand.
Even though it may be that an annuity dependent upon life is a contingent demand
within the meaning of the bankruptcy
act of 1898, yet this contract, so far as regards the support of the wife, is not dein
pendent on life alone but is to cease
case the wife re-marries. Such a contingency is not one which, in our opinion,
is within the provision of the act because
of the innate difficulty, if not impossibility, of valuing the particular contingency of widowhood," per Peckham,
J. Dunbar v. Dunbar, supra. Although
this case presents a somewhat different
question from the one under discussion,
we are of opinion that the reasoning is
fully applicable to the matter in hand.
We hold, therefore, that the contract of
annuity, condition upon life, marriage
or divorce, was not a claim provable in
bankrur tcy. The discharge, accordingly,
would not affect the obligation and the
plaintiff could recover for any annuity,
except such as matured prior to the
filing of the petition. We have been
led to a full expression of our views upon
this case by reason of the lack of adequate

treatment of the bankruptcy features in
the opinion of the court below. As intimated at the start, it is impossible to
ascertain just what the expression "back
annuity" means, which is of prime importance in dealing with the plea pleaded.
We will therefore reverse the judgment of
the court below and award a procedendo,
to give parties opportunity to amend statement.
Judgment reversed and procedendo
awarded.

JOHNS vs. INS. CO.
Insurance-Avoidanceof policV by act of
assured-Effect of execution of assured.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Plaintiff's testator held a policy of insurance on his life, payable to his estate.
The insured was executed for the crime of
murder. It was afterwards discovered
beyond a doubt that he was innocent of
the crime for which he was executed.
There was no stipulation in the policy as
to death at the hands of the law. There
is no other defense to the policy than the
above facts shown.
CARLIN for plaintiff.
The language of an insurance policy is
to be construed most strictly against the
company.
Metropolitan Ins. Co. v. Drach 101 Pa.
278; Burkhardt v. Travelers Ins. Co. 102
Pa. 262.
Defendant was liable if the deceased's
death was not the natural cause and
reasonable result of his own misconduct.
Bradley v. Mut. Benefit Ins. Co., 45 N. Y.
422; Watts v. Com. Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
48 N. Y. 34.
Yocum for defendant.
The law refuses to allow a recovery on a
policy of life insurance, on the grounds of
public policy, whenever death results at
the hands of justice. Hatch v. Ins. Co.,
120 Mass. 550. Cloffv. Mut. Benefit Life
Ins. Co., 13 Allen 308; Wells v. Life Ins.
Co., 191 Pa. 207; Amicable Society v.
Bolland, 5 H. L. Cas. 70.
Insurer has a right to insist that all the
conditions ofthe contract,-express and implied, be fulfilled by the assured. Raum
v. Home Ins. Co., 59 N. Y. 387; Stone v.
Hooper, 9 Con. 154 ; Allwe v. Orland, 2
Johns Cas. 52. Conerty v. Benton, 17
Johns 142; Mount v. Waits, 7 Johns 434.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Plaintiff's testator held a policy of insurance on his life, payable to his estate.
The insured was executed for the crime of
murder. It was afterwards discovered be-

THE FORUM
yond a doubt that he was innocent of the
crime for which he was executed. There
was no stipulation in the policy as to death
at the hands of the law.
There,is no other defence to the policy
than the above facts show.
The only point upon which we think it
necessary to decide this question is as to
the manner of death.
We have examined several policies issued
by as many companies, and in all there is
only one stipulation as to death, and that
refers to suicide, the policy being rendered
void if the act is committed within a year
in some cases, and within two years in
others. There is also a stipulation as to the
incontestability of a policy after a certain
time; namely, one and two years. We
have not, however, enough facts in our
possession to warrant a decision on this
ground, as we have not been informed as
to the length of time which this policy
has been in effect.
We have also examined the statutes of
a number of States, and there is no -provision made as to death at the hands of
the law, but to the contrary, they give an
insurance company full power to take any
risk they desire. The Pennsylvania Statutes provide that corporationg incorpor.
atedu nderprovisionsof the Actof Assembly
for the insurance of human beings against
sickness, death or personal injury, shall
have the power and right to make insurance of every nature and kind, and insurances of every kind against the death,
sickness or health of human beings by
disease of every kind, whether within
this Commonwealth or beyond it; and
such corporation shall have the power
and right to make, execute and perfect
such, and so many, contracts, agreements
and policies and other instruments as may
be required therefor. Act of April 24; 1874.
This contract is between the Insurance Co. and the deceased. The contract is valid, having all the requirements
of a contract. It is an absolute and unqualified contract. Therefore, this being
so, can one of the parties after the per.
formance by the other refuse to carry out
his part of the contract? There has been
no stipulation against death and the conditions of the contract have presumably
been complied with.
If the company refused to pay this

money on the ground that the deceased had
made a default in his payment, the case
would be otherwise, but all we may consider are the facts as presented to the court.
We cannot see that it would be against
public policy to allow a recovery on this
policy. There is no fostering, aiding or
abetting of crime, and as the deceased had
paid the penalty for his crime, by death,
if guilty or innocent, why should his
property be allowed to remain in the company with whom he had contracted, he
has done nothing to cause him to lose his
property.
They stipulated to pay this
money at his death. They have taken his
money for the premiums, as they have
become due, should they be allowed to all
the benefits of his contract, and keep the
money paid as premiums, and also the
money contracted for? We think not.
The language of an insurance policy is
to be construed most strongly against the
company. Metropolitan Ins. Co. v. Drach,
101 Pa. 278. Burkhardt v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 102 Ra. 262.
The insurance company will be estopped
from making a defence after having stipulated to pay, simply because it would be
against public policy.
If the insurance company wrongfully
revokes the policy the assured may recover the full amount of the premiums
paid thereon, with interest, even though
he has been having the benefit of the insurance under it from its inception to the
day of its wrongful revocation, and though
such revocation would not operate in law
to avoid the contract, the insured may
elect whether he will enforce the policy or
treat it as rescinded. Van Werden v. Ins.
Co., 99 Iowa 621. We think that as all
the requirements of the contract were
complied with, and as this contest did
not come until after the policy had been
issued and after the death of the assured,
the representatives should be allowed
to recover on this policy.
Judgment is therefore rendered for the
plaintiff.
MOOREHOUSE, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

We find ourselves utterly unable to
agree with the reasoning in the opinion
of the learned court below. It is to be deplored that the learned court did not
employ more of its valuable time in a
reference to the authorities cited in the
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briefs submitted by counsel, instead of indulging in a vain and weak effort at a
priorireasoning. The facts in the case can
give rise to the question whether in au
action brought by the executor upon a
policy of life insurance, payable to the estate of the insured, and containing no express stipulation against death at the
hands of the law, it is a valid defense that
the insured was hanged for murder, although admitted in this action to have
been innocent of the crime for which he
suffered the extreme penalty. Policies of
life insurance like all other contracts must
conform to regulations of the law. "Contracts are enforced by the courts not for
the benefit of the parties, but because the
law regards the enforcement of contracts
in general as essential to the welfare of the
community; whenever, therefore, it appears that it would be prejudicial to the
public interest to enfore a particular kind
of contract the courts refuse to enforce
contracts of that character." Harrimon on
Contracts, p. 101. It is an elementary
principle of the law of life insurance that
the risk assumed by the insurer does not
include death at the hands of justice.
"Even though a policy contains no provision for forfeiture in the event of the
execution of the insured for a crime there
can be no recovery when the insured is
executed." Elliott on Ins., p. 419. As
early as 1830, the English courts had held
in the case of Amicable Society v. Bollard,
5 H. L. C. 70, that an assignee of a policy
of life insurance could not recover when
the insured was executed for a capital
felony, although the policy contained no
express stipulation against such an event.
"Would not such a contract (if available)
take away one of those restraints operating on the minds of men against the commission of crime, namely, the interest we
have in the welfare and prosperity of our
connection." Per Ld. Lyndhurst, Society
v. Bollard, supra. This is the classical
case upon the subject and has been judicially followed in this country. "Even if
this risk were not excepted, or were
specially covered, it would be against
public policy to permit a recovery in such
a case." Kerr on Ins., p. 393. Ritter v.
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 169 U. S. 139. It
was intimated by the learned court below
that the incontestability clause in the

policy might affect the question, but such
clauses manifestly are inoperative to
waive defenses which are raised by law on
grounds of public morality, as the defense
in question or the kindred one of lack of
insurable interest. Elliott on Ins., p. 4 10 .
Does the admitted innocence of the insured differentiate our case from the
above line of authority? A case almost
on all fours with the present one is found
in Burt v. Union, etc., Ins. Co., 23 Sup.
Ct. Rp. 138. The insured was convicted of
murder and hanged. The policy contained no express provision as to death resulting from crime. The assignees brought
suit on the policy alleging the innocence
of the insured. Held, that even if the
allegations were true, there could be no
recovery. "Can there be a legal life insurance against the miscarriage ofjustice?
Can contracts be based on the probability
of judicial murder? If one policy so
written be valid, the business of insuring
against the fatal mistakes of jurie6 and
courts would be legitimate. The same
principle could be applied in a kind of
accident insurance to the miscarriage of
justice in cases that led to conviction and
punishment not capital, and in each suit
to enforce-such a policy the issue as to the
fatal judicial mistakes would be tried by
another jury and court not infallible,"
per Brewer, J. We adopt the reasoniug
of the above learned judge as conclusive of
the question under consideration. It is
to be noted that in the case at bar the
plaintiff is the representative of the insured and not an assignee or beneficiary,
thus making the facts stronger than
in Burt v. Ins. Co., supra, where the
assignees were seeking to recover. We
thus escape a distinction between the
rights of assignees and beneficiaries on
the one hand and those of the insured and
his estate on the other, that has found
judicial sanction in the courts of Penna.
Morris v. State, etc., Assur. Co., 183 Pa.
563, and those of sister States. Darrow v.
Family Fund Society, 116 N. Y. 537;
Seiler v. Life Assoc. 105 Ia. 87. Hard
cases, but prove a rule, and although the
doctrine as laid down appears harsh when
applied to the facts of the case under consideration, we are persuaded of its complete soundness, and hold therefore that
the plaintiff in this case cannot recover.
Judgment of lower court reversed and
judgment for defendant.

